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highly desirable solution as it would favor various local policies
while redressing the violations of the federally created right.
From a practical standpoint, Borak seems to be the more desir-
able of the two decisions. If Dann is followed, the state courts could
still refuse to take jurisdiction by holding that in determining the
consequent effects of invalid proxies, they would be enforcing a lia-
bility created by the federal law, in contravention of the exclusive
jurisdiction provision of section 27.4r Furthermore, even if the state
courts did take jurisdiction to decide the "state law" aspects of the
action, two actions would be necessary before relief could be
granted. Besides the time and money lost in this litigation, plaintiff
would also lose the benefits of liberal venue and nationwide service
of process available under section 27.48
Moreover, Borak carries out the purpose of section 14(a), pro-
tecting investors in securities, to a much greater degree than Danm.
The very fact that the private action exists in addition to the en-
forcement by the Commission adds to the protection afforded by the
act .4  The decision also serves as a warning that any advantage
obtained through illegal solicitation may be taken away in a private
action after the vote. As such, it is a psychological weapon against
those who would make use of such methods.
ROBERT B. LONG, JR.
Liability of Continuing Shareholder for Constructive Dividend
When a closely held corporation redeems the shares of one
stockholder, the threat of a constructive dividend may present tax
problems for the continuing shareholder. The problem arises when
one major shareholder has decided to leave the corporation and an-
other wishes to remain. Basically, there are two ways for the con-
tinuing shareholder to acquire complete ownership of the corpora-
tion: (1) the continuing shareholder may use his personal funds to
' State courts have so far refused to hear any claim or defense based
upon § 14(a) because of § 27. E.g., Investments Associates, Inc. v. Standard
Power & Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 225, 48 A.2d 501 (Ch. 1946), aff'd, 29 Del.
Ch. 593, 51 A.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., 23
N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (Ch. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 12 N.J. 467,
97 A.2d 437 (1953).
See these provisions of § 27 in note 16 supra.
"Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 21, Borak v. J. I. Case Co., 317
F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963).
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purchase the shares of the retiring stockholder, or (2) the corpora-
tion may use its funds to redeem the shares of the retiring stock-
holder.
There is at least one persuasive reason for having the corporation
redeem the shares rather than having the remaining shareholder
make the purchase. The remaining shareholder's personal funds
may be insufficient to purchase the shares of the departing share-
holder, and he may have to look to the corporation itself for the
funds needed to purchase the retiring shareholder's interest. If the
continuing stockholder takes corporate funds into his own hands
in order to purchase the shares of the retiring stockholder, there
must be a dividend declared to him; and, therefore, a personal in-
come tax will be precipitated at the shareholder level. The conse-
quence of this tax may leave the continuing shareholder with in-
sufficient funds to purchase the shares of the retiring stockholder.
It thus becomes a matter of tax economy' (and often a matter of
economic necessity) that the continuing shareholder so arr-ange the
transaction that no dividend need be declared to him, and that no
constructive dividend may be imputed to him. The desire for such a
use of corporate funds-a redemption by the corporation free of
dividend tax dangers to the continuing stockholder-brought about
the transactions in two recent cases.
In one decision,2 the remaining shareholder made a contract to
purchase the shares of the other stockholder. Unable to perform
due to a lack of funds, the remaining shareholder assigned his con-
tract to a third party. The third party purchased the shares from
the retiring shareholder, and they were subsequently redeemed by
the corporation from the third party. The Commissioner argued
that the effect of these transactions constituted a constructive divi-
dend to the remaining shareholder. The grounds were that the
'A simple illustration shows the economics of the situation: X and Y
each own fifty per cent of the corporation, and they agree that on the death
of either, the remaining shareholder will purchase the other's stock for
$50,000, the fair market value of the stock at the time of the agreement.
When Y dies, the corporation is worth $200,000. Assuming that X is in the
fifty per cent tax bracket, he will have to declare a dividend of $100,000 from
the corporation to himself in order to obtain the purchase price of $50,000.
This would leave X with a corporation worth $100,000. However, if a re-
demption is provided for, the corporation will pay $50,000 and X will then
be the sole owner of a corporation worth $150,000.
'Milton F. Priester, 38 T.C. 316 (1962).
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corporation had satisfied the remaining shareholder's obligation to
purchase the stock, and that the third party was merely used as a
"straw man" to effect this purpose. Rejecting this line of reasoning,
the Tax Court held that there was no constructive dividend. The
third party was not merely a "straw"; rather, the facts indicated that
he was an independent businessman acting for his own interests.3
The taxpayer was not as fortunate in another instance.4 There
the remaining shareholder also contracted to purchase the retiring
shareholder's interest. Through necessity, or choice, the taxpayer
borrowed money from the corporation and made the purchase him-
self. The shares were subsequently redeemed from the remaining
stockholder, the consideration being a cancellation of his debt to the
corporation.5 It was held that the discharge of the debt was es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend to the extent of available earnings
and profits in the corporation.6
DId. at 325.
'Aloysius McGinty, 38 T.C. 882 (1962).
From a technical point of view, the continuing shareholder received a
dividend by failing to come within the provisions of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 302 which allows certain redemptions to be treated as capital exchanges
rather than as dividends.
In Hargleroad v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 92 (D.C. Neb. 1962), the
continuing shareholder received the shares from the retiring shareholder
and had them redeemed himself. The court disregarded the circuitous means
used to effect the redemption, and looked at the net effect of the transaction,
construing that there was only a redemption and that there was no con-
structive dividend to the remaining shareholder. But compare Neff v.
United States, 305 F.2d 455 (Ct. Cl. 1962) where a different approach was
used. The sole shareholder had the corporation redeem his shares in order
that the corporation could resell the shares and obtain additional working
capital. On resale of the shares, the corporation made a large profit. But
the court refused to look at the net effect of the transaction and held the
redemption to be a dividend to the remaining shareholder because it failed
to qualify under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302. The court felt that the busi-
ness purpose involved was subservient to the code provisions which in effect
provide that where a redemption of stock of a sole shareholder occurs, it will
be considered a dividend to the extent of available corporate earnings and
profits, rather than payment in exchange for the stock which would obtain
sale or exchange treatment. In order to obtain sale or exchange treatment,
the payments must meet the redemption qualifications in INT. REv. CODE oF
1954, § 302. If not, the payment will be treated as a dividend under INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301(c), 316(a).
' The 1954 Code treats disbursements to the retiring shareholders fairly
explicitly, however, there are no express provisions concerning the taxability
of the remaining shareholders where the corporation redeems the shares of
a retiring stockholder. Case law has developed in this field under INT. Rnv.
CODE OF 1939, § 115(g) and subsequently under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 302(b) (1). Under those provisions, the question is this.; "Was the pay-
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The historical development of the law in regard to the contin-
uing shareholder's liability for a constructive dividend can be traced
in the following manner:
The first group of cases concerned facts similar to those involved
in the McGinty case.' The rule was established that where corporate
funds were used to satisfy the remaining shareholder's obligation
to purchase, then he would be deemed to have received the equiva-
lent of a taxable dividend.8
The next important case involved an individual who had an op-
tion to purchase the remaining shares of a corporation in which
he had a substantial interest.' He assigned his option to the corpora-
tion and the shares were redeemed. The Tax Court held that this
was clearly a constructive dividend to the taxpayer because no
corporate purpose was served and because the net effect was that
the corporation made the purchase for the remaining shareholder.
This ruling was reversed on appeal.,0  The taxpayer was never
ment to the retiring shareholder 'essentially equivalent to a dividend' to the
remaining shareholder?" See Graham, Redemption Problems: The Holsey
and Zipp Cases, 36 TAxES 925 (1958).
7 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
T'Two of the leading cases establishing liability for constructive dividends
where the corporation assumes the taxpayer's obligation to purchase are Wall
v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947) and Thomas J. French, 26
T.C. 263 (1956). In the Wall case the taxpayer had given notes to purchase
shares in the corporation. He surrendered the stock to the corporation and
the corporation agreed to pay the note. In French, the taxpayer borrowed
money from the corporation itself. He subsequently surrendered part of the
stock and the corporation cancelled the outstanding debt. In both cases it
was held that the satisfaction of the taxpayer's obligation was essentially the
equivalent of a taxable dividend. See also, Zipp v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d
119 (6th Cir. 1958); Ferro v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957);
Woodworth v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1955); Lowenthal v.
Commissioner, 169 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1948); Edgar S. Idol, 38 T.C. 444
(1962); George M. Hancock, 18 T.C. 210 (1952).
'Holsey v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 962 (1957), rev'd, 258 F.2d 865 (3d
Cir. 1958). For a discussion of this case and subsequent revenue rulings,
see Ward v. Rountree, 193 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Tenn. 1961), where two
shareholders each owned fifty per cent of two different corporations. One
corporation redeemed the stock of one shareholder, and the other corporation
redeemed the shares of the other shareholder. It was held that the remaining
shareholder(s) did not receive a constructive dividend as a result of the re-
demption (s).
" Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1958). The court
disregarded the arguments as to whether there had been a business purpose
for the redemption. It was stated that the effect of the redemption rather
than its purpose was the controlling factor in determining whether the re-
demption was equivalent to a dividend.
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"obligated" to purchase the shares and the shares never came into
his possession. Therefore, there was a straight redemption and no
constructive dividend to the remaining shareholder. 1 The Commis-
sioner agreed to follow this decision.12
A subsequent revenue ruling seems to depart somewhat from
the "obligation" test.13 The taxpayer was obligated either to pur-
chase the shares or to vote his stock for liquidation of the corpora-
tion. Instead of pursuing either alternative under the contract, the
shareholder caused the corporation to redeem the shares for book
value and for a valid business purpose. It would seem that the
corporation had clearly satisfied the continuing shareholder's obli-
gation (and certainly the corporation expended funds to render that
obligation moot), but it was ruled that there was no constructive
dividend. The "obligation" cases were distinguished because here
the taxpayer never bought the shares for himself, nor did he obli-
gate himself to do so, except in the alternative. In the prior "obliga-
tion" cases, the shareholder had either actually purchased the shares
before the corporation redeemed, or he was obligated to do so with-
out express reference to any corporate redemption.
It is apparent that the decided cases put a premium on the draft-
ing of the agreement. If the parties provide for corporate redemp-
tion, the continuing shareholder is saved from the constructive divi-
dend, because he was at no time obligated to purchase the shares.' 4
11Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952), is another example of an unsuccess-
ful attack by the Commissioner where the taxpayer was not obligated to
purchase the shares. The taxpayers bought a portion of the retiring share-
holder's stock and had the corporation issue its notes to the retiring share-
holder in redemption of the remainder of the stock. The Commissioner
argued that when the notes were paid off, the remaining shareholders re-
ceived the equivalent of a dividend, because the corporation was paying the
debt for the remaining shareholders. The court did not follow this theory
because the debt was solely that of the corporation. The continuing share-
holder was never obligated.
1
',Rav. Rut. 58-614, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 920. The ruling warns that if
the stock is surrendered to the corporation for less or more than fair market
value, it may be treated as a gift to or from the retiring shareholder.
" REv. RuL. 59-286, 1959-2 Cum. BuI.. 103.
"
4The remaining shareholder may not want the working capital of the
corporation to be diminished by the redemption cost. In such a case, he
could take over the corporation's obligation to purchase the stock, since the
retiring shareholder probably would not object. There is, however, some
danger in this approach. The redemption price could be less than the fair
market value of the stock. When the corporation assigns the contract to
the shareholder who is to remain, what will be the result? No case law
concerning this type arrangement has been found. The assignment could be
[Vol. 42
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The same result could be obtained if the corporation were obligated
to purchase the shares, contingent on the continuing shareholder's
not having previously exercised an option to buy the shares for him-
self. 5 This agreement would be more flexible in that the remaining
shareholder could use either his own or corporate funds. Thus the
shareholder's needs and the needs of the corporation at the time of
redemption or purchase could both be considered in determining
which course to follow.
It seems questionable that the continuing shareholder should
ever be taxed as having received a constructive dividend where the
action taken has the same effect as a straight redemption. Since re-
demptions are allowed, it is somewhat unjust to penalize a share-
holder who discovers, after he has obligated himself, that he would
be better off having the corporation redeem. Also, the whole theory
behind the "obligation" cases seems somewhat illogical. If a
shareholder's obligation to purchase is assigned to a third party, the
shareholder would never be taxed for the benefits accruing to that
third party as a result of the assignment. Admittedly, the result in
such an instance may differ where the assignment is made to the cor-
poration, in that the assignor receives the benefits of the contract be-
cause he becomes the sole owner of the corporation. But this is not
the complete consequence. The corporation which the remaining
shareholder now owns in its entirety is diminished by the amount
of the redemption price.16 When the shareholder makes the assign-
ment, he not only assigns his obligation, but he also assigns the
benefits which would otherwise flow to him. Since there has been
a loss of benefit as well as obligation, why should there be a con-
structive dividend ?17
treated as a gift to the remaining shareholder of the excess over fair market
value. But this possible threat might be avoided by allowing the corpora-
tion to redeem and by contributing more capital at the time of redemption.
" This clause in the agreement should be very carefully worded in order
to avoid the construction that the shareholder was obligated to purchase the
shares. For instance, the following type clause should be avoided: "At such
time, the remaining shareholder will purchase, or the corporation will re-
deem, such shares."
" Assume X and Y are equal shareholders in a corporation whose shares
are worth $200,000. If X buys the shares, he becomes the sole owner of a
corporation valued at $200,000. On the other hand, if the corporation re-
deems Y's stock for $100,000, then X becomes the sole owner of a corpora-
tion worth only $100,000.
"' Erickson v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. Ill. 1960) lends sup-
port to this argument. In this case, the obligation theory was not followed.
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Moreover, if the continuing shareholder is to be taxed at all,
as having received a constructive dividend, why should the results
be dependent on whether the shareholder "obligated" himself to
buy the shares? For policy reasons, some sort of "business pur-
pose" test would seem more consistent. For example, it would seem
logical to tax the continuing shareholder where the corporation had
a real need for working capital but nevertheless used the needed
funds to redeem at a price which was no bargain, for the sole pur-
pose of accommodating the remaining shareholder. On the other
hand, it would seem illogical to tax the continuing shareholder when
the corporation had excessive funds on hand to use for redemption
at a price which was a bargain. Under the obligation test, however,
these factors would not be considered.
Under the present state of the law, it seems unlikely that the
Commissioner will attack again where there is no obligation on the
remaining shareholder to purchase the shares, regardless of whether
there was any business purpose whatever for the redemption. It
would seem even more unlikely that the courts would rule for the
Commissioner should he take such action. Until some change is
effected concerning the "obligation" theory, the drafters of the pur-
chase or redemption contract should beware the constructive divi-
dend.
JOHN SIXES JOHNSTON
The stockholder borrowed money from a third party to purchase the shares
from the estate of a deceased shareholder, in agreement with the other re-
maining shareholders. The corporation, when it became financially able, paid
off the stockholder's debt to the third party and cancelled the shares. Al-
though it would seem that the shareholder's obligation was satisfied, it was
held that there was no dividend. The court stated that in reality there had
been merely a redemption by the corporation from the deceased share-
holder's estate. The form of the transaction was regarded as being merely a
temporary expedient which would enable the corporation to retire the shares
without overextending its financial position at the time.
The taxpayer in effect assigned his benefits under the contract, as "well as
his obligation, to the corporation. Consequently, he received no constructive
dividend.
If the continuing shareholder were never taxed on a constructive divi-
dend where the net effect of the transaction was that of a redemption, the
substance of the transaction would be controlling, rather than its form.
[Vol. 42
